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Summary 
The objective of the present report is to analyse under which circumstances the firm 
investments triggered by the investment support are additional, i.e. when does the firm-level 
investment support makes investments possible that otherwise would not have been 
undertaken.5 In order to answer this question we analyse theoretically how the investment 
additionality and the co-financing rate affect the firm investment behaviour in differently 
competitive markets.  
We find that the investment additionality and the level of competition importantly affect the 
firm investment behaviour. Imposing additionality to the ECP investments in perfectly 
competitive markets causes distortions in the capital market and leads to lower welfare levels. 
In contrast, without the enforcement of additionality, the distortions are zero and the 
investment support fully benefits the firms. In an imperfectly competitive environment the 
firm-level investment support may increase investment and may be welfare increasing with 
and without the enforcement of the investment additionality. These results are new, as policy 
implementation details have not been studied in the context of the ECP before. 
 
                                                 
5 In general, three types of ECP additionality can be identified: project-level additionality, programme-
level additionality and MS-level additionality. In this paper we consider the additionality at project 
(firm) level but the results can be generalized to any implementation level of ECP.  
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1 Introduction 
Support to firms is one of the key priorities of the EU Cohesion Policies (ECP) and an 
essential component of the Renewed Lisbon Strategy – Europe 2020. During the current 
programming period 2007-2013 more than 28 billion Euro are used to support firm 
investment across the Member States (MS). The ECP grants to firms are mainly used to 
support private investment to improve the private capital stock (European Commission 
2010). 
There have been many attempts to measure the impact of public policy support for firms 
(Ferrara et al. 2010; Rae 2010). Some studies find that firm-level investment support induces 
additional investment in supported firms (Harris and Trainor 2005; Pellegrini and Centra 
2006; Duch et al. 2009; Gadd, Hansson and Månsson 2009). In contrast, other studies do not 
find positive effects (Bronzini and de Blasio, 2006). Similarly, the employment impact of 
capital subsidies has been found doubtful (Gabe and Kraybill, 2002), and the effect of firm-
level investment support on efficiency and productivity is found to be negligible or even 
negative (Beason and Weinstein 1996; Lee 1996; Bagella and Becchetti 1998; Bergström 2000; 
Harris and Robinson 2004; Bernini and Pellegrini 2011). Moreover, there is a considerable 
variation in the estimated impact of investment support which, among others, reflects 
differences in circumstances between countries, regions, sectors and firms, differences in the 
design of policy and delivery (policy implementation details), and differences in the quality of 
the data and the analytical methods used in the empirical studies. 
An important drawback of existing studies, which increases uncertainty about the true ECP 
impact, is that they do not explicitly consider the policy implementation details, such as 
additionality, capping rules, maximum co-funding, and the funding gap. However, according 
to Bergström (2000), substitution of private capital by public capital, i.e. non-additionality, 
is one of the main causes of failures of firm-level investment subsidising efforts. Inter-
temporal substitution implies that firms may bring forward investment projects originally 
planned for the post-intervention period in order to take advantage of the investment 
support. Cross-sectional substitution implies that subsidised firms take some of the 
investment opportunities that unsubsidised firms would have exploited in absence of the 
investment support. 
The objective of the present report is to analyse under which circumstances the firm 
investments triggered by the investment support are additional, i.e. when does the firm-level 
investment support makes investments possible that otherwise would not have been 
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undertaken.6 In order to answer this question we analyse theoretically how the investment 
additionality and the co-financing rate affect the firm investment behaviour in differently 
competitive markets.  
We find that the investment additionality and the level of competition importantly affect the 
firm investment behaviour. Imposing additionality to the ECP investments in perfectly 
competitive markets causes distortions in the capital market and leads to lower welfare levels. 
In contrast, without the enforcement of additionality, the distortions are zero and the 
investment support fully benefits the firms. In an imperfectly competitive environment the 
firm-level investment support may increase investment and may be welfare increasing with 
and without the enforcement of the investment additionality. These results are new, as policy 
implementation details have not been studied in the context of the ECP before. 
 
2 The EU Cohesion Policies 
The ultimate objective of the ECP is to promote economic growth and employment and to 
simultaneously reduce regional disparities, e.g. in terms of regional income per capita and 
rates of unemployment. Within this ultimate objective, the relevant provisions of law identify 
the following three derived objectives:7  
 Convergence is concerned with speeding up the convergence of the least developed 
Member States and regions. This objective focuses in particular on promoting 
investments in physical infrastructure, human capital, R&D, and aid to productive 
sectors; 
  Regional competitiveness and employment covers all the rest of the EU outside the 
convergence regions which focuses in particular on investing in human resources, 
R&D, and promoting entrepreneurship and environmental protection; 
  European territorial cooperation aims at strengthening cross-border cooperation, 
transnational cooperation, interregional cooperation and exchange of experience. 
In order to achieve these objectives,8 the ECP implements financial instruments relating to 
investment in specific sectors and areas and with different intensity of aid and within a well-
identified programming, which in the current programming period is lasting seven years from 
2007 to 2013. Depending on the form of investment (physical capital, human capital, R&D, 
                                                 
6 In general, three types of ECP additionality can be identified: project-level additionality, programme-
level additionality and MS-level additionality. In this paper we consider the additionality at project 
(firm) level but the results can be generalized to any implementation level of ECP.  
7 See Art. 3(2) of the General Regulation. 
8 For an overview of these objectives see European Commission (2007: 10-26). 
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support to productive sectors), different financial instruments are implemented: the European 
Social Fund (ESF), the Cohesion Fund (CF), and the European Regional Fund (ERDF). The 
use of the ECP financial instruments is characterised by: (i) targeting specific sectors of 
investment in well-identified eligible areas; (ii) modulating the intensity of aid by applying a 
number of co-funding rules. The eligibility for co-funding within the ECP is defined over two 
main elements: area and the sector of investment. Moreover, different eligibility rules apply 
for each of the three financial instruments. The ERDF can finance investment in regions 
relating to the three objectives of convergence, regional competitiveness and employment, 
and European territorial cooperation. Although, the eligible sectors of investment are many, 
the ERDF finances mainly physical infrastructure, R&D, human capital and aids to 
productive investments. The ESF finances mainly human capital and labour-market related 
investments in regions relating to the objective of convergence, and of regional 
competitiveness and employment. Finally, the CF finances mainly projects in the field of 
transport, environment, and energy if the investments have beneficial impacts on the 
environment. The CF may finance investments in countries whose GNI is less than 90 per 
cent of the EU-27 GNI, or it would have been eligible assuming the same threshold for the 
EU-15. 
According to the provisions of Annex II, Part A, Commission Regulation 1028/2006,9 the 
total ECP expenditures are classified in 86 categories of expenditure in the programming 
period 2007-13. The 86 programmes target sectors such as transportation, renewable energy, 
environment, research and development, labour market, etc. (Ferrara et al. 2010). Around 
8% of the total ECP budget (28 billion Euro) is allocated to investment support to both large 
and small businesses, including productive investment and the provision of business support 
services. Significant share of these funds is directly or indirectly benefiting the SMEs 
(European Commission 2010). 
The ECP co-funding is subject to several implementation rules. At the National Strategic 
Reference Framework level, the principle of additionality and the capping rules;10 at the 
operational programme level, the maximum co-financing rate for eligible expenditure;11 at the 
investment project level, the funding gap given by the difference between the discounted 
investment costs and the discounted net revenue to identify eligible expenditure.12 These 
ECP implementation rules result in using matching grants subject to the principle of 
additionality, whose total amount and the overall financial leverage depend mainly on the 
                                                 
9 
www.cc.cec/dgintranet/regio/documents/20072013/a_sf_reg2007_2013/corrigendum_commission_re
g.pdf 
10 See Art. 15 and Annex II(7) of the General Regulation, respectively. 
11 See Annex III, General Regulation. 
12 See Art. 55(2), General Regulation. It is worth noting that the funding gap does not apply to 
investment projects whose financing is classified as State aids (see Art. 55(6)). 
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level of GDP, and whose specific matching rates depend on the project’s self-financing 
ratios.13 
The principle of additionality means that the ECP may not replace the national or 
equivalent expenditure by a Member State.14 The principle of additionality is verified at 
national level by the Commission, in cooperation with Member States, for the regions covered 
by the Convergence objective. At the ex-ante stage, the Commission and the Member States 
decide the level of eligible public or equivalent spending to be maintained all over the 
programming period. For each Member State concerned the Commission verify the 
compliance with the principle of additionality at the mid-term of the programming period, in 
2011, and at the end of this period, in 2016. The objective of additionality is to set realistic 
but sufficiently ambitious targets for structural public expenditure, in order to ensure the 
additional trait of the ECP intervention. As a general rule, the average annual level of 
expenditure in real terms shall be at least equal to the level attained in the previous 
programming period (European Commission 2010).  
 
3 Previous studies 
The size of the ECP expenditure’s share in the total EU budget (over 50%) has generated a 
large interest between policy makers, taxpayers and academics (Stryczynski 2009). Although 
the additionality principle is implemented at MS level, from policy efficiency perspective it 
can be disaggregated to programme-level additionality as well to project-level additionality. If 
the ECP is to produce additionality at the MS level, it must have similar effect not only at 
the aggregate level but also at the individual project level. In other words, if investment of 
firms undertaking ECP projects improves, the ECP has also additional effect at aggregate 
level. Whereas some studies suggest that firm-level investment support induces additional 
investment in supported firms (Harris and Trainor 2005; Pellegrini and Centra 2006; Duch et 
al. 2009; Gadd et al. 2009); others do not find positive effects (Bronzini and de Blasio, 2006). 
Similarly, the employment impact of capital subsidies has been found doubtful (Gabe and 
Kraybill, 2002), and the effect of firm-level investment support on efficiency and productivity 
is found to be negligible or even negative (Beason and Weinstein 1996; Lee 1996; Bagella and 
Becchetti 1998; Bergström 2000; Harris and Robinson 2004; Bernini and Pellegrini 2011). 
 
                                                 
13 This ratio is the complement to one of the funding gap and it is given by the ratio of discounted net 
revenue and discounted investment costs. 
14 European Commission, Article 15 of Regulation (EC) No 1083/2006. 
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3.1 Positive evidence of firm-level investment support 
Harris and Trainor (2005) estimate a linear static production function model with a set of 
explanatory variables, time variables to control for business cycle effects and a binary 
dummy variable for Selective Financial Assistance (SFA) capturing different types of firm-
level investment support. The model is estimated for Northern Ireland and accounts for 
possible endogeneity of capital, employment, intermediate inputs and the SFA.15 The results 
of Harris and Trainor suggest that the total factor productivity would have been 7-10% lower 
if the Northern Ireland firms had not received SFA. By comparing different types of firm-
level investment support, Harris and Trainor find that capital grants are more likely to have 
a positive impact on the TFP compared with other forms of firm-level investment support, 
and that the impact of the SFA was stronger towards the end of the sample period from 1990 
– 1998. Harris and Trainor also find that SFA reduced the probability of firm closure by 
15-24%. 
Pellegrini and Centra (2006) use a conditional difference-in-difference estimator as a 
combination of the standard difference-in-difference estimator and the matching estimator to 
estimate the impact of firm-level investment support on turnover and employment. These 
outcome variables are modelled as a function of selected covariates in a panel setting with 
individual and time-effects and a dummy for being supported or not. Their results for Italy 
indicate that growth in turnover, employment and fixed assets has been more dynamic in 
subsidised firms and that such firms have invested more as well as increased the number of 
employees stronger than firms in the control group. 
Employing a difference-in-difference estimator Bronzini and de Blasio (2006) investigate the 
effect of firm-level investment support on investments of Italian firms. The results of Bronzini 
and de Blasio suggest that subsidies have a positive effect on private investments. They find 
that firm-level investment support induces additional investments by the supported firms; 
however these investments do not trigger faster growth.  
Duch et al. (2009) analyse the effect of subsidies on firm performance in Spain by employing 
a propensity score model. Their results show that, on average, the supported firms recorded a 
higher value added growth than the non-supported firms. Furthermore, the results point to 
the fact that firms with low value added grow faster than those, which have already reached 
a high level of value added. Duch et al. also present evidence that diversified, centrally 
located, and exporting firms constitute higher growth rates for value added. Finally, Duch et 
                                                 
15 From the baseline specification, the SFA-receiving firms are also allowed to interact with 
explanatory variables in the model through various ways such as: (i) composite dummy effects 
(multiplication of the SFA-dummy with employment, capital stock, etc.), to investigate whether firms 
which received SFA might operate using different technologies compared to non-supported firms, (ii) 
interaction terms between the SFA and firm age and ownership structure, as well as (iii) 
disaggregation of the SFA into capital grants and all other ECP support. 
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al. do not find significant growth differences between the high technology manufacturing 
industries and service sectors. Generally, their results suggest that public subsidies have a 
positive and significant impact on the growth of value added. 
Gadd et al. (2009) estimate the effect of firm-level investment support on firm performance 
by employing a propensity score model. According to their results, both firm characteristics 
and regional context matter for the probability to receive public policy support. After 
performing the matching algorithm, Gadd et al. find a significant positive difference in 
employment growth, indicating that firms which received the investment subsidy increased 
the number of employees stronger than their matched pairs in the control group. However, 
the profitability, measured as differences in return on total assets, does not differ significantly 
between supported and non-supported firms. Generally, the results of Gadd et al., suggest 
that investment subsidies had some effect on employment, but not on the return on total 
assets.  
 
3.2 Zero/negative evidence of firm-level investment support 
On the other hand, Beason and Weinstein (1996) use industry-level data for evaluating the 
effect of firm-level investment support in Japan, and find no evidence of productivity 
enhancements as a result of firm-level investment support. 
Lee (1996) studies the TFP between 1963 and 1983 in South Korea, and finds that firm-level 
investment support actually lowered the TFP of the supported firms. Lee finds that targeting 
of low productivity firms amounted to a form of increased protection, which decreased 
competition and thus efficiency levels. These results suggest that firm-level subsidies can 
foster further lack of competition and lower efficiency, as firms become over-reliant on 
''production'' subsidies and fail to reorganise their activities and improve their performance 
to the same extent as non- supported firms that face the same competitive market pressures. 
Bagella and Becchetti (1998), studying Italian data, find a set of partly contradictory results. 
In the short run, subsidies seem to cause a higher level of indebtedness for firms which 
receive them with non-decreasing costs of debt, so apparently there is no mis-allocation of 
financial resources. In the long run, subsidised firms exhibit lower levels of productivity when 
compared to non-subsidised ones, lending support to the idea that this exogenous ”shock” is 
re-absorbed by the market. 
Bergström (2000) finds no significant effect of firm-level investment support on total factor 
productivity in Sweden. More precisely, Bergström finds that in the first year after having 
received incentives, the treated firm productivity increases. However, in the following years 
additional subsidies reduce the TFP growth, which may signal that in the long run subsidies 
can lead to negative productivity and welfare effects. 
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Harris and Robinson (2004) find that RSA in the UK had no effect on productivity by 
comparing supported firms to other firms within the supported area. 
Bernini and Pellegrini (2011) study the impact of firm-level investment support in the 
southern Italian regions over the period 1996–2004. Employing a difference-in-difference 
matching estimator, and taking selection on observables and non observables into account 
they find a higher growth in output, employment and fixed assets in subsidised firms but a 
lesser increase in the TFP than in unsubsidised firms. The negative impact on long term 
productivity and growth reduces the positive temporary effects of regional subsidies. 
 
3.3 Causes of mixed evidence 
The results of previous studies provide mixed and inconclusive evidence on whether firm-level 
investment support increases firm investment and improves firm performance. Bergström 
(2000) identifies two main causes of failures of firm-level investment subsidising efforts, which 
may be responsible for the mixed evidence. First, investment support may displace private 
investments (inter-temporal substitution). Second, it may cause crowding out of investment 
in non-subsidised firms (cross-sectional substitution). This suggests that measuring the 
impact of firm-level investment support amounts to gauging the extent to which the firm 
investments triggered by the incentives are additional, i.e. does the firm-level investment 
support makes investments possible that otherwise would not have been undertaken? 
First, because of the availability of investment support, firms may have brought forward 
projects originally planned for the post-intervention period. As shown by Abel (1982), a 
temporary investment subsidy gives firms a strong incentive to invest while the incentive is 
in effect. This effect has been extensively studied in the literature on the effects of incentives 
for investments and purchasing of durable goods (Auerbach and Hines 1988 and Adda and 
Cooper 2000). Bronzini and de Blasio (2006) show that inter-temporal substitution 
considerably affects the investment pattern of supported firms in Italy. They find that a 
potential effect of aid may be to boost investment during the period in which the aid 
programme is in place, at the cost of reducing investment subsequently. In this case, a 
positive effect of the subsidies is not a proof of additionality, as without aid the same 
investment would have been made in the future. Similalry, Cannari et al. (2006) find that 
inter-temporal substitution is significant: 64.2 percent of firms that would have invested less 
without subsidies declared that they would have postponed the investment. Cannari et al. 
also find that inter-temporal substitution is more widespread among businesses located in the 
Centre and the North of the country, while lack of profitability and lack of external resources 
have more effect on southern companies. Finally, their results suggest that inter-temporal 
substitution is more important for firms in traditional sectors, while the opposite holds true 
for lack of profitability. 
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Second, subsidised firms may receive some of the investment opportunities that non-
subsidised firms would have otherwise had in absence of the investment support. In presence 
of cross-sectional substitution subsidised firms take some of the investment opportunities that 
unsubsidised firms would have exploited in absence of the investment support (Harris and 
Trainor 2005 and Lee 1996). Adopting the difference-in-difference approach, Bronzini and de 
Blasio (2006) find that supported firms have substantially increased their investments when 
compared with the pool of firms whose applications have been rejected. A similar crowding 
out process might also occur because of general equilibrium effects. Firm-level investment 
support may change the price of capital in a region as a whole if it affects a substantial 
number of firms. For example, Goolsbee (1998) shows that investment incentives have little 
impact because much of the benefit does not go so much to investing firms as to suppliers of 
capital through higher prices. Cross-sectional substitution is particularly important when the 
market in which the firms compete is small and when the firms are close in their industrial 
distance (Rosenthal and Strange 2004). Bronzini and de Blasio (2006) find that that cross-
sectional substitution is more intensive for firms located in the same area or competing in the 
same sector.  
 
4 The role of additionality in the EU Cohesion Policies: A theoretical 
analysis 
In order to answer the question under which circumstances the firm investments triggered by 
the investment support are additional, i.e. when the firm-level investment support makes 
investments possible that otherwise would not have been undertaken, it is necessary to 
evaluate additionality. We develop the theoretical model to study how the investment 
additionality affects the impact of firm-level investment support on firm investment 
behaviour in differently competitive markets. We adopt a static framework and focus on 
analyzing conditions under which additional effects may occur. We do not analyse inter-
temporal substitution or cross-sectional substitution between support and firm investments. 
 
4.1 The model 
The representative firm’s output in a given sector is assumed to be a function of the amount 
of capital, K. The production function is represented by ( )f K  with 0Kf  and 0KKf .
16 The 
capital K is a stock variable which supplies services used by the firm during the production 
process. For simplicity, we assume that the investment capital, K, is financed from a bank 
                                                 
16 
K
f  and 
KK
f  are first and second derivatives of the production function with respect to capital, 
respectively. 
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loan, L, at interest rate i, which is assumed to be fixed. The capital good’s price is equal to 
the discounted present value of future rents. The firm’s profit function is given as follows: 
(1) kKKpf  )(  
where k is the rental price of capital, )(  iRk , p is the price of the final product17, R is 
the unit price of capital good, and   is the capital depreciation rate. The firm’s capital 
rental unit costs include interest payments, iR , and the depreciation costs, R .18  
The equilibrium conditions are given as follows: 
(2) )()1()1(   iRkpfK   
(3) K S    
(4) L RK  
where S is the capital supply function.  Equation (2) represents the firm marginal condition 
for capital services derived from the profit maximisation problem. It represents firm's 
decision on the optimal quantity of capital use by taking in consideration marginal benefits, 
pfK, and marginal costs, k)1(  , adjusted by the market imperfection factor,  . The capital 
equilibrium condition (2) yields a standard capitalisation formula ))(1(   ipfR K , 
which implies that the capital good price is equal to the present value of the future capital 
rents. Parameter   measures the degree of imperfect competition (defined as the ratio 
between the marginal profit and the rental price of capital), which could be a result of 
market imperfection that constrains firms’ capital use such as credit constraint or credit 
rationing. If 0 , then the firm marginal value product of capital exceeds the marginal cost 
of capital k. Everything else equal, by increasing the investment, the firm could increase its 
profit. Market imperfections reduce capital use and firm profitability. If 0 , then the 
firm's equilibrium condition (2) collapses to the competitive market result, where 
K
pf k , 
implying that all profitable opportunities of capital are exploited if this equilibrium holds.  
Equation (3) represents the equilibrium market clearing condition for the capital good, where 
capital good supply, S, equals the firm demand for capital, K. To simplify the analysis, we 
assume a perfectly elastic capital supply, implying that the rental price of capital, k, is 
fixed.19  
                                                 
17 For illustrative purpose, we assume that the economy is small and open, which implies that the 
output price is fixed. 
18 For example if 0  then the capital good is undepreciable such as land.  
19 This is consistent with the short-run modelling of capital market, where firms adjust capital 
quantities as a response to a policy change. Other effects, such as changes in prices and/or quantities 
of other inputs will take place in medium to long-run perspective. Usually in firm investment literature 
variable inputs are assumed to change in the short-run, whereas capital is assumed to change in the 
long-run. Because our objective is to analyse the effect of investment support, the change in firm 
capital is a short-run effect of the policy. Then in the long-run, adjustment of other inputs and/or 
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Implicitly, we assume that capital costs are exclusively financed through bank loans. The 
total firm loan demand, L, is determined by the capital good’s price, R, and the quantity of 
capital invested by the firm, K, L RK  (equation (4)). The total firm’s interest costs on the 
loan equal iRK .20 More precisely, the firm uses loans to purchase capital goods from capital 
suppliers. In return it pays interest costs to the bank on the borrowed loan.  
In summary, this model implies four agents in the capital market: representative firm, loan 
suppliers (banks), capital suppliers (e.g. machinery/technology suppliers), and the 
government. The loan suppliers provide loans to firm. The firm uses loan to buy capital 
goods from the capital suppliers. The firm uses the services of capital goods to produce final 
products. The government intervenes in the capital market with the investment subsidy (see 
further). 
The capital market is illustrated in Figure 1. Condition (2) determines the firm’s demand for 
capital services and is shown in Figure 1 by curve Dpc for the perfectly competitive sector 
( 0 ), and by curve Dic for the imperfectly competitive sector ( 0 ). The vertical 
difference between Dpc and Dic represents the price mark-up,   Kpf)1(   . The horizontal 
line S represents the supply of capital services. The intersection between the demand and the 
supply yields the equilibrium bundle of the rental price and the capital use, (k*, Kpc
*) and (k*, 
Kic
*) in the perfect and the imperfect sectors, respectively. The investment is smaller in the 
imperfectly competitive than in the perfectly competitive sector, Kic
*< Kpc
*. 
 
4.2 The impact of firm-level investment support 
Let   denote the investment co-financing rate of the ECP programmes. The co-financing 
rate   measures the share of the total value of the supported investment (purchase costs of 
supported capital investments), which is subsidised from the ECP programme. In line with 
the ECP co-finding rules, the maximum quantity of capital eligible for support is constrained 
at 
max
K .21 
An important factor affecting the impact of firm-level investment support is to what extent 
the investment additionality is enforced. The objective of the ECP is to increase the quantity 
or/and the quality of the capital, i.e. to create an additionality effect. In terms of our model 
                                                                                                                                                        
prices follow as a reaction to policy induced capital change. Further, note that when incorporating this 
partial equilibrium approach into a general equilibrium framework all price and other input effects are 
accounted for (Kielyte 2008). 
20
 This assumption is not strictly needed to obtain the results. The interest rate i represents the income 
to capital owners. If one would consider firm-owned capital, then the interest rate i would represent 
opportunity cost of capital. 
21 This is a more realistic assumption, because the actual budget for the ECP is limited and is subject 
to competition, implying that not all capital benefits from the support. We assume 
max
K  sufficiently 
low; less than the equilibrium quantity of investment in the absence of support (see below).  
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this implies that the policy objective is to increase the stock of capital relative to the capital 
stock used by firms at the prevailing market prices of capital. In order to study the impact of 
additionality, we analyse two situations: perfect enforcement of additionality and imperfect 
(no) enforcement of additionality. 
With investment support the firm’s profit function (1) changes to: 
(5)   snosno KiRkkKKKpf  )(  
(6) subject to eligibility constraint maxKKs   
where 
no
K  is the part of capital, which does not benefit from the investment support, and sK  
is the part of capital which benefits from the support. We split the total firm capital in 
no
K
 
and sK  in order to allow the possibility that not all firm capital may benefit from the 
support. This is consistent with the implementation regulation of the ECP. In reality not all 
firm capital can benefit from the support but there are imposed maximum eligibility 
thresholds. Note that only the capital sK  benefits from the support in our model. 
The value of the ECP support per unit of capital is equal to the capital price multiplied by 
the co-financing rate, R . The investment support reduces capital purchase costs. The firm 
loan demand decreases by an equivalent amount resulting in lower loan interest costs. In 
terms of our model, the investment subsidy is equivalent to and interest rate subsidy. More 
precisely, the support reduces loan interest costs per unit of supported capital by iR , i.e.
 
iRiRRiRiR )1()(   . The investment additionality has important implications for 
firm behaviour particularly in terms of how it affects marginal capital profitability. When we 
consider the investment support and the issue of the additionally enforcement, the firm 
equilibrium capital marginal condition (2) changes as follows:22 
Firm equilibrium conditions if the support affects capital profitability at the margin 
(additionality enforced or imperfectly competitive sector): 
(7) 0)1()(  kKpfK noKno    
(8) 0))(1()(   iRkKKpfK snoKs   
Firm equilibrium conditions if the support does not affect capital profitability at the margin 
(additionality not enforced): 
(9) 0))(1()(   iRkKpfK sKs    
(10) 0)1()(  kKKpfK nosKno   
where   is shadow price of the eligibility constraint maxKKs  . 
                                                 
22 We consider the case when the support affects only the firm interest costs. In general, this is 
consistent with the implementation of the firm-level investment support. The support finances 
purchase costs of capital. The depreciation costs (δR) are not eligible for the support. 
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Profit equation (5) implies that the profitability of capital is higher for the supported capital, 
Ks, (by αiR) than for the unsupported capital, Kno . However, the support improves capital 
profitability at the margin only in equations (7)-(8) but not in equations (9)-(10). This 
difference is due to the enforcement of the investment additionality or due to the presence of 
market imperfections (see further). We illustrate this in Figure 2 for the perfectly competitive 
demand, Dpc.
23 First, consider equations (7)-(8). Note that the equilibrium without the 
support is (k*, Kpc
*). Up to the equilibrium investment with no support Kpc
*, the support has 
no effect on the marginal capital profitability. Capital Kpc
* does not benefit from the support 
(i.e. Kno = Kpc
*), and the capital demand is given by curve Dpc (this follows from equation 
(7)). For the investment higher than Kpc
*, the support increases capital profitability at the 
margin (by αiR*) for the quantity of capital up to Kmax. Kmax represents the supported capital, 
Ks = Kpcs
* – Kpc
* = Kmax (this follows from equation (8)).
24 This implies a discontinuous firm's 
capital demand. Starting in the left-hand side of the Figure 2, the capital demand is given by 
the curve Dpc, Dpcs, Dpc. By assumption, when the investment additionality is enforced, 
equations (7)-(8) always hold. This is because the additionality makes only additional capital 
eligible for the support. With the presence of market imperfections, equations (7)-(8) will 
tend to hold with and without the investment additionality enforced (see further). 
Second, consider equations (9)-(10). Up to the investment Kpc1, the support increases the 
profitability of capital at the margin (by αiR*) up to the maximum quantity allowed Kmax (Ks 
= Kpc1 = Kmax) and capital demand is given by the curve Dpcs1 (this follows from equation 
(9)). Beyond Kpc1 the support does not affect firms' marginal profitability, implying that the 
capital demand is at Dpc (this follows from equation (10)). As above, this implies a 
discontinuous firm's capital demand. Starting in the left-hand side of the Figure 2, the 
capital demand is given by curve Dpcs1, Dpc. Note that at the margin the firm capital 
profitability is not affected by the support, at investment Kpc
*. In the next sections we show 
that this situation may occur when the additionality is not enforced and with no market 
imperfections.  
 
4.3 Perfect enforcement of the ECP additionality 
A perfect enforcement of investment additionality implies that policy makers are able to 
enforce that firms increase their investment by the quantity of the supported investment 
relative to the investment at the prevailing market prices of capital. In other words, only the 
additional capital which firms invest benefits from the support. The equilibrium bundle of 
                                                 
23 Similar can be shown for the imperfectly competitive demand, Dic. 
24 Note that in the case shown in Figure 2, the eligibility constraint maxKKs   is binding, 0 . 
This does not hold in general. For sufficiently high maximum eligibility threshold, firm may not 
exploit the investment support possibility in full. 
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the rental price and capital use without the investment support in place is (k*, Kpc
*) and (k*, 
Kic
*) in the perfect and the imperfect competitive sectors, respectively. This implies that 
under the perfect enforcement of the investment additionality, the capital use Kpc
* and Kic
* is 
not eligible for the support, only capital application beyond this levels can be granted 
investment subsidies (Figure 1). 
With perfect enforcement, the support shifts the equilibrium investment from Kic
* to Kics
* in 
the imperfectly competitive sector, and from Kpc
* to Kpcs
* in the perfectly competitive sector. 
In both types of sectors the quantity of capital increases by eligibility threshold, Kmax. Note 
that part of the capital, Kmax, benefits from the investment support, while the rest of the 
capital used by firm is not eligible for the support. The firm capital use increases only 
because the additionality is enforced. However, the uptake of the support is voluntary. The 
firm has incentive is to apply for the investment subsidy because of profit increasing effect 
(the policy reduces costs for the supported capital).  
There are important differences in the firm investment behaviour between perfectly and 
imperfectly competitive markets. Under the perfect competition, a cohesion policy which 
supports capital investments is welfare decreasing. On the other hand, in the imperfectly 
competitive sector the investment support may generate welfare gain. Under the imperfect 
competition, the additional investments Kmax generates productivity gain equal to area ABCE 
(Figure 1). The policy costs are equal to area BC, implying a net welfare gain equal to area 
A (equal to productivity gain, area ABCE, minus the rental costs of capital, area BCE)25. 
Firm's gain is equal to area ABC, given by the net productivity gain (area A) and the gain 
from the support (area BC).26  
Under the perfect competition, the additional investment Kmax generates productivity gain 
equal to area GH, which is less than the rental costs of capital (area FGH), implying a net 
welfare loss equal to area F. Area F is the deadweight loss resulting from the misallocation of 
capital recourses. Firm benefits part of the support, which is equal to area G (equal to 
productivity gain, area GH, plus policy support, area FG, minus the rental costs of capital, 
area FGH).  
The man intuition of the above results is that under the perfect competition firms are able to 
exploit all profitable opportunities even without the support. Firm increases capital 
investments because it is an eligibility requirement for receiving the support. Additional 
investments lead to distortions on the capital market resulting in welfare losses. Under the 
imperfect competition, positive mark-up exists, which makes additional investment 
                                                 
25 Note that this is not a general result. If the mark-up is not sufficiently large, then the net effect of 
the investment support could actually lead to a welfare loss. 
26 Note that in a general equilibrium model tax distortions and other inter-sectoral and inter-regional 
distortions need to be accounted for to obtain total welfare effects of the investment support. 
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opportunities profitable. The support shifts the investment closer to the perfect competition 
situation, i.e. * * * *
pc ic pc ics
K K K K , thus leading to welfare gains. 
 
4.4 Imperfect enforcement of the ECP additionality 
Often, however, policy makers cannot enforce investment additionality in reality, because 
usually there are no available counterfactual data to check the firm investment level with 
and without the support. Policy makers can observe only capital use with the support. At the 
same time, firms do not have incentive to reveal their true counterfactual investment 
intentions. This makes the monitoring of the application of investment additionality costly 
and thus hard to enforce. 
First, consider the perfectly competitive sector (Figure 1). The equilibrium investment 
without the support is *
pc
K . We assume that the maximum eligibility thresholds is maxK , 
where *
max ic
K K .27 In this case, the equilibrium capital with and without the support is *
pc
K , 
all the support (area FG) benefits firm and the support does not create distortions in the 
capital market. In equilibrium the firm invests Kpc1 to claim the support up to the maximum 
allowed, 
1 maxpc
K K , and gains full value of the support, area H (=area FG). However, firm 
can consider expanding investments by 
max
K  (as shown in the previous section with the 
perfect enforcement of the investment additionality). In this case the equilibrium investment 
would shift to *
pcs
K  and firm's gains would equal to area G. Given that the area H is larger 
than the area G, due to the decreasing capital productivity, it does not pay-off to increase 
capital beyond *
pc
K  if 
*
pcs KK  .
28 This implies that with perfect markets, private investments 
are crowded out by subsidised investments. The firm investments would be undertaken even 
in the absence of the ECP support policy.   
Next, consider the imperfectly competitive sector. In the previous section (with perfect 
enforcement of the investment additionality) we have shown that with the increase of capital 
by 
max
K  (to *
ics
K ) firm gains from policy support are equal to area ABC, which is more than 
the gain (area H) obtained if the capital quantity is kept unchanged at *
ic
K  (Figure 1). Hence, 
with imperfect competition it is optimal for firm to increase investment by 
max
K  and the 
equilibrium capital with and without the enforcement of investment additionality is the same 
at *
ics
K .29  
                                                 
27 Note that *
max ic
K K also implies that *
max pc
K K . 
28 The intuition behind this result is that with perfect competition firms can exploit all profitable 
investment opportunities even without the support.  Providing investment support to firms (such that 
*
pcs KK  ) does not alter investment opportunities available to firms. Firm optimal behaviour is to 
use the same quantity of capital with and without the support.  
29 Note that this does not hold in general, only for the cases when the mark-up is sufficiently large as 
shown in Figure 1. 
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The main intuition behind these results is that with perfect markets, the ECP cannot 
improve the investment opportunities of firms. Firms undertake the same level of capital 
investments independently of whether the policy is in place. In this case the investment 
support represents to a large extent a pure income transfer to firms from taxpayers. This is 
not the case with imperfect markets where the ECP support allows firms to expand 
investments and thus exploit otherwise unused profitable investment opportunities.  
 
5 Conclusions 
Additionality is one of the key principles driving the functioning of the EU Cohesion Policies. 
The present report studies how additionality and co-financing affects the firm investment 
behaviour. Using the example of firm-level investment support we illustrate the impact of 
additionality in perfectly and imperfectly competitive sectors. 
We find that the investment additionality and the level of competition importantly affect the 
firm investment behaviour. The allocation of the firm-level investment support to a perfectly 
competitive sector increases investment only, if the investment additionality is enforced. 
When imposing the principle of additionality, firms are able to exploit all opportunities even 
without the support. Allocating investment support to such a sector and enforcing the 
additionality causes distortions in the capital market and leads to lower welfare levels. 
However, without the enforcement of additionality, the distortions are minimal and the 
support represents a large extent an income transfer to firms. Only in imperfectly competitive 
sectors (e.g. due to increasing returns to scale, credit constraint) the firm-level investment 
support may increase investment and may be welfare increasing with and without the 
enforcement of the investment additionality. In this case policymakers should not be 
concerned about the enforcement of additionally. 
Our findings suggest that for achieving sensible policy results, not only the amount of 
support given to the firms is important, but also the way how money is allocated as well as 
market conditions under which it is granted are highly important. If investment substitution 
possibilities are not controlled for, i.e. if additionally is not enforced, then profit maximising 
firms may solely substitute private investment by public investment resulting in policy 
inefficiencies. An efficient firm-level investment support policy should strictly consider under 
which market conditions (imperfect versus perfectly functioning markets) the investment 
support is allocated. The consideration of market situation is as relevant policy objective as 
the additionality enforcement. If the ECP is targeted on the sectors which are deprived from 
the access to capital, firms will always have the tendency to increase capital use even if the 
additionality is not enforced; moreover the ECP will have a welfare increasing effect. Under 
imperfect market conditions firms have private incentive to increase investments, whereas 
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with aditionality enforced firms may increase investment only because it is politically 
imposed possibly leading to welfare losses.  
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Figure 1. Firm investment support and additionality: perfect and imperfect competition  
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Figure 2. Firm investment support and additionality: perfect competition 
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